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Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
One specific aspect of state response to protest is the policing o f protest, 
which we define as the police handling o f protest events - a more neutral 
description for what protestors usually refer to as ’repression’ and the state as 
’law and order’. While the repression variable has been included in several 
models on the preconditions for collective action (among others, Tilly, 1978, in 
particular 101-6; Skocpol, 1979; McAdam, 1982), empirical research on the 
relationship between police and protest in Western democracies is still rare. 
There is, therefore, a significant gap to be filled in the literature with 
comparative studies on protest and policing; moreover, protest policing is a 
particularly relevant issue for a thorough understanding of the relationship 
between social movements and the state:
The study of the ways police interact with other citizens is of primary importance for 
anyone concerned with public policy and the just resolution of contemporary urban 
conflict. Police may be conceived as ’street-level bureaucrats’ who ’represent’ 
government to people. And at the same time as they represent government policies, 
police forces also help define the terms of urban conflict by their actions. The 
influence of police on political attitudes and developments is fundamental because of 
the unique role of law enforcement agencies in enforcing and reinforcing the norms 
of the system (Lipsky, 1970: 1).
Police intervention has, in fact, a strong impact on protestors’ perceptions 
of the state reaction to them (della Porta, 1995). Waves of protest, in turn, have 
important effects on the police, as Jane Morgan (1987) observed in her historical 
research on the police in Great Britain. Protest policing would appear to be, in 
fact, a key issue for the professional self-definition of the police. For the process 
of modernization and professionalization of European police forces in the 19th 
century, it was of decisive importance that the police should become the 
principal agency responsible for the safeguarding of internal security and public 
order, marginalizing thus the military in this role. As the example of post-war 
Germany illustrates, the way in which the police deal with protest in 
contemporary democratic societies seems to be a significant, if not dominant, 
aspect of their self-image (Winter 1996). The importance of these reciprocal 
repercussions highlights the need for an in-depth study of protest policing in a 
comparative perspective.
In the following, we shall propose some hypotheses on the origins, 
development and consequences of different models of police protest control. Part 



























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
in protest policing before discussing in a comparative perspective some 
hypotheses on the significant historical cross-national differences in protest 
policing and on the recent trend towards a ’softer’ and more tolerant attitude in 
Europe. In part II we propose a model for the explanation of protest policing 
styles. Drawing on the research presented and on the literature on state responses 
to protest, we illustrate our hypothesis that protest policing is determined on a 
first level by (a) the organizational features of the police, (b) the configuration 
of political power, (c) public opinion, (d) the police occupational culture, (e) the 
interaction with protestors. All of these influences are filtered, on a second level, 
by (f) the police knowledge, defined as the police’s perception of external 
reality, which shapes the concrete policing of protest on the ground. In a final 
part, we discuss the effects of the most recent trends in protest policing on the 
fate of social movements (Part III).
I. TRENDS AND CYCLES IN THE EVOLUTION OF PROTEST 
POLICING
In order to reflect on the consequences of protest policing we need to 
understand how the policing of protest varies: How can different ways of 
policing protests be characterized? Which cross-national differences can be 
identified? How did they evolve over time? Pertinent to a characterization of 
different ways of policing protests are the suggestions in social movement 
literature on the classification of the forms and nature of state control. Gary 
Marx (1979) distinguished repressive actions according to their specific aims: for 
instance, the creation of an unfavourable public image; information gathering; 
restriction of a movement’s resources and limitation of its facilities; de­
recruitment of activists; destruction of leaders; fuelling of internal conflicts; 
encouragement of conflicts between groups; sabotage of particular actions. 
Charles Tilly’s typology (1978: 106-115) classified political regimes on the basis 
of the degree of repression and ’facilitation’ they manifest towards various 
collective actors and actions: repressive regimes repress many groups and actions 
and facilitate few of either; totalitarian regimes repress fewer groups and 
facilitate a wide range of actions, even to the point of making them compulsory; 
tolerant regimes accept a wide range of actions, but reduce the power of 





























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
Police studies formulated a series of typologies about police styles in order 
to characterize the intention and impact of different ways of policing. For 
instance, Bayley (1986) distinguished police interventions as oriented towards 
mediation, separation, coercion or counselling. Black (1980: 130-2) defined 
various styles of social control, such as the penal style, the conciliatory style, the 
therapeutic style and the compensatory style. Muir (1977) described four types 
of police officer: the professional, the reciprocator, the enforcer and the avoider. 
Particularly helpful for the study of local police sub-units is the distinction 
between fire-brigade policing, local intelligence policing and community policing 
(Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982, Chs. 2, 3, 8, 9).
Drawing on these two approaches, it is possible to develop more specific 
and detailed categories for the study of protest policing. Some relevant 
dimensions are presented in Figure 1 (see also della Porta, 1995).
[figure 1 approx, here]
A combination of these dimensions describes the protest policing style 
(understood as a subcategory of police style) employed by the police forces at 
protest events. For instance, police who repress a large number of protest 
groups, prohibit a wide range of protest activities, and intervene with a high 
degree of force are employing a diffused, repressive and ’brutal’ protest policing 
style. It has been noted, that the different dimensions tend to define two coherent 
protest policing styles, one more opportunist, tolerant, soft, selective and 
flexible, the other legalistic, repressive, hard, diffuse and dissuasive (Wisler e 
Barranco 1996).
Research on state-building and democracy indicates the existence of 
different national styles for dealing with challengers. States with an equilibrium 
of power among the different social classes (particularly among the monarchy, 
the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie), first-comer nation-states and small states 
facing strong competition in the international markets developed integrative 
styles, while the other states were tendentially exclusive (see, for instance, 
Marks, 1989; Kriesi et al., 1995). Moreover, experiences with authoritarian 
regimes tend to have long-lasting consequences on police style (see Reiter 1996).
With regard to traditional police styles, the ’civilized’ British ’bobby’ - 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
political power - has been contrasted with the militarized continental police, who 
live in barracks and are dependent on political power. Already in the 19th 
century the London Metropolitan Police was viewed by the liberal press on the 
continent as an example of what a police force should be. For instance, an 
article published in the German illustrated journal Die Gartenlaube in 1878 on 
’the blue men of London’ started, as any article on the London police in a 
German illustrated journal might have 100 years later, with the cliché of the 
friendly bobby giving directions to a foreign tourist (Katscher, 1878). It also 
noted the traditional ’low-profile response’ o ' the London police and their 
positive relationship with the public. Particular emphasis was placed on the 
accountability of every policeman, which thus assured that neither the single 
bobby nor the London police force as a whole was a threat to individual or 
collective liberty. Two lines of argument were generally used to explain these 
characteristics of the English police, as in the case of this article in Die 
Gartenlaube'. on the one hand, the common law tradition in England in contrast 
with the Roman law tradition on the continent and, on the other hand, the 
origins of the English police in the tradition of community policing. However, 
as Robert Reiner (1996) shows, ’the ideal British police model was not a 
reflection of some natural, in-built harmony or order in British society and 
culture.’ On the contrary, ’a low-profile, legalistic, minimal force strategy was 
encouraged because of, not despite, the bitter political protests and acute social 
divisions of early 19th century Britain’.
On the European continent the counter-model to this strategy was formed 
by the French tradition of a ’King’s police’, i.e. a state police dependent on and 
under strict control of the centrai government, charged with a very wide range 
of tasks, and originally standing as a synonym for the interior state 
administration. At the same time, the French example served as a model for the 
police forces in other European countries and was drawn upon during debates 
on the institution of the London Metropolitan Police as a scarecrow to warn 
against the liberticidal aspects of this type of law enforcement (Bunyan, 1977: 
63).
Nonetheless, myths aside, there do in fact appear to be visible differences 
between the record of the English police and the continental police forces in the 
field of protest policing in relation to the the ’old’ challengers, i.e. democratic 
and labour movements. On the continent, police action against challengers 
seemed to aim at defending not only a general system of power, but a concrete 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
rights, the consequences of this modality for the policing of protest are easily 
imaginable. The protest policing styles traditionally dominant on the continent 
were more ’brutal’, more repressive, more confrontational and more rigid than 
in England.
It should be noted, however, that significant differences also existed within 
the overall framework of the continental police systems, both over time and 
between countries, stretching from the French police of the Third Republic to 
the police system of national-socialist Germany.1 After World War II 
differences continued to exist on the continent. Latin police styles, based on the 
unconstrained use of force, were distinguished from the Central-European style, 
characterized by respect for the Rechtsstaat. A comparison of Italy and Germany 
from the 1960s to the 1990s (della Porta 1995, Ch. 3) gave rise to the 
observation that consistently throughout this period the police handling of protest 
seems to have been more selective in Germany than in Italy. Since the very 
beginning, in fact, the German police tended to intervene only very sporadically 
in industrial conflicts, and repression was particularly focused instead on small 
political groups. On the contrary, in Italy, especially in the 1950s and early 
1970s, police handling of larger groups, including the trade unions and the 
Communist Party, was ’brutal’. Moreover, the search for protest handling 
techniques capable of selectively addressing violent groups began earlier in 
Germany. While in Italy protest policing tended to involve a higher degree of 
force (at least until the 1980s), the German style was characterized by a greater 
dependence on intelligence (collection of information, etc.). The Italian police 
forces were also often accused by the left of having resorted to what protestors 
considered dirty tactics, such as a widespread and unconstrained use of agents 
provocateurs, the protection of the neo-fascists, and the direct involvement of 
the secret services in massacres and in plotting coups d’état. Similar charges 
were much less frequent in Germany, where the police appeared to be more 
constrained by a formal respect of the Rechtsstaat. Referring back to our 
dimensions presented in Figure 1, the Italian protest policing style during this 
30-year period can be described as more ’brutal’, more diffused, more illegal, 
more informal, and more artisanal than the German style.
1 Liidtke (1992: 17) sees the long-term changes in Germany since the 19th century in 





























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
For the decades since the 1960s, recent research pointed to a progressive 
assimilation of the different models of European policing, including protest 
policing. In Great Britain, a ’militarization’ thesis developed, based on the 
premise that the British police were moving towards the militarized, continental 
model in the control of public order. The riots in several British cities in the 
beginning of the 1980s as well as the policing of the miners’ strike later on have 
- according to this hypothesis - unleashed a new trend in the British police 
(Jefferson, 1990). However, not all police scholars in Great Britain agree on the 
presence of a trend towards ’militarization’, usually understood as ’tough’ 
policing. In research based on participant observation of numerous police 
interventions during public demonstrations in London, P.A.J. Waddington 
showed that the availability of legal and technological resources for paramilitary 
intervention does not automatically mean that these resources are actually 
implemented (Waddington, 1994; see also 1996). Quite to the contrary, he 
observed the prevalence of a tolerant style of policing.
On the ’continent’, a contrary trend was singled out. Connecting police 
professional culture with the main frames about protest policing in Germany, 
Martin Winter’s analysis of specialized police journals during the 1960-90 period 
shows a shift towards a growing acceptance of forms of direct action (Winter 
1996). The debate on the military- versus civil-oriented character of the police 
overlapped in Germany with the debate on protest strategy, with the 
traditionalists claiming the need for a hard line against the ’anarchists’ in order 
to ’state an example’ and the reformists - among whom the reform-oriented 
police trade union - defending a ’soft approach’. While prior to 1968 
demonstrations were largely identified with Storung der ojfentlichen Ordnung 
and, based on a Le Bon approach, the potentially dangerous ’crowds’ had to be 
controlled in a paramilitary way, in the 1970s the Neue Linie instead recognized 
demonstration as a basic right. After some roll-backs during the period of 
terrorism and the anti-nuclear campaign, the debate was dominated from 1985 
on by the implications of the Brokdorf decision of the federal Constitutional 
Court. This judgement stated that ’the right to demonstrate must be protected’, 
thus a Burgerpo1': conception now tends to prevail.
Interpreted as parallel movements, the trends in England and Germany 
seem to confirm the progressive assimilation of the different styles of European 
protest policing observed above. Over time, cross-national differences between 
the European countries seem to have diminished. Recent research on protest 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
brought forth similar conclusions (see Reiner, 1996; Waddington, 1996; Fillieule, 
1994 and 1995; Fillieule and Jobard, 1996; Winter, 1992 and 1996; Jaime 
Jimenez 1996; della Porta, 1996; De Biasi, 1996; McCarthy, McPhail and 
Schweingruber, 1996). A general trend emerges regarding protest policing styles 
which, on the basis of the variables presented in Figure 1, can be defined as 
’soft’, tolerant, selective, legal, preventive, consensual, flexible and professional.
If this seems to be the common general trend, both in Great Britain and 
in continental Europe, protest policing within any given country can be seen to 
be selective, with a contemporary presence of diverse protest policing styles, 
implemented in different situations and directed towards different actors. For 
France, Fillieule and Jobard (1996) describe a paternalistic model of intervention 
(based on a ’soft’ management of violent demonstrations). In the case of the 
farmers’ demonstrations, in particular, both tactical and political necessities have 
often seemed to push the police towards tolerating certain episodes of violence. 
In other instances, however, the French police have shown an antagonistic 
attitude, resorting to a repressive policing style. Within the general trend towards 
a more tolerant style, della Porta (1996) singles out four different models of 
protest policing for Italy: a model of cooperation, based on collaboration 
between the police force and demonstrators, and an inconspicuous police 
presence; a model of negotiation, based on a more active police presence with 
the objective of mediating between the demonstrators and ’non-demonstrators’ 
who are said to suffer the disruptive effects of protests; a model of ritualistic 
stand-off, based on a more ’aggressive’ police presence, but often at a distance; 
and a model of total control, based on a massive presence and close involvement 
of the police forces. The principal example of recourse to the first model can be 
seen in the large union demonstrations; of the second, direct action by 
unemployed or homeless people; of the third, demonstrations by autonomous 
groups of the radical left: and of the fourth, the control of football fans at the 
stadium.
On the basis of recent research, the three most significant tactical 
tendencies characterizing protest policing in the 1990s appear to be: a) 
underenforcement of the law; b) the search to bargain; c) large-scale collection 
of information. The strategy used during the 1980s and up to the present appears 
to be dominated by the attempt to avoid coercive intervention as much as 
possible. Law-breaking, which is implicit in several forms of protest, tends to 
be tolerated by the police. Law enforcement is usually considered as less 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
policing in the 1960s and 1970s, when attempts to stop unauthorized 
demonstrations and a law and order attitude in the face of the ’limited rule­
breaking’ tactic used by the new movements manoeuvred the police repeatedly 
into ’no win’ situations. This recent underenforcement of the law, however, 
highlights the large discretion of the police, especially if considered together 
with the selectivity of protest policing, i.e. the contemporary presence of 
different police styles, implemented in different situations and directed at 
different actors, as discussed above.
Secondly, in order to avoid disorder, complicated procedures of 
negotiation emerged. This tendency is not new. For the Germany of the 1960s, 
Martin Winter (1996) notes that, following public criticism of the ’hard line’ 
adopted by the police, public relations efforts were increased and the support of 
police psychologists was institutionalized. Other research indicates an increasing 
formalization of bargaining techniques. For the United States, McPhail, 
McCarthy and Schweingruber (1996) document the sharp contrast between the 
general practices of protest policing in the 1960s, characterized by escalated 
force, and those of the 1980s and 1990s, characterized by negotiated 
management, which found significant expression in the development of a protest 
permit system. In his study of the London police, P.A.J. Waddington observed: 
’The principal method of securing compliance was through negotiation with the 
organizer of the protest’ (1994: 69). The official notification required for a 
demonstration, as set down by the Public Order Act of 1986, also has the 
function of bringing about ’reasonable negotiations’.2 In the course of his 
research, Waddington noted a considerable bureaucratization and formalization 
of the entire procedure, with the effect of reinforcing obedience to the law. By 
way of example, standardized formulae were presented to negotiators for 
demonstrations which, despite the fact that there was no legal requirement, they 
were invited to sign as proof of good faith on both sides. Without matching the 
level of bureaucratization of the British case, other countries, including France, 
Germany and Switzerland, have witnessed the growing role of police officers 
responsible for ’public relations’, acting as mediators between demonstrators and 
the forces of order.
Thirdly, the collection o f information has received substantial attention by 
the police. The use of intelligence in the control of protestors is not a new trend.
2 In fact, 85% of the marches observed were preceded by a negotiation, often a series 



























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
In his book on the ’Red Squads’, the specialized units employed against 
subversion that proliferated in American cities, Frank Donner (1990) suggests 
that there was a shift during the 1930s from traditional interventionist practices 
to ’intelligence’; that is, information gathering and surveillance, including the 
compilation of files and their aggressive use to damage the protestors. The role 
of the Red Squads was strengthened in the 1960s, when the FBI was thwarted 
by its own old conception of the left as ’communists’ and by millions of 
dossiers of old - or dead - radicals: ’The core of the red squads operation’, 
according to Donner (Ibid.'. 66), ’was identification of anyone and everyone 
involved in protest activities. The names and associations of activists ... were 
recorded and filed. Lists and dossiers of subjects were coded, stored, indexed 
and disseminated to other intelligence agencies (federal, state, and urban). Police 
countersubversive agencies multiplied greatly as "intelligence" became a standard 
branch of urban police practice, even in cities where it had theretofore played 
a relatively minor role’. Technological advances allowed for an increasing level 
of control (Ibid.'. 67).3 In more recent times too, the availability of new 
techniques together with growing professionalization have been reflected in an 
ever-increasing attention to the collection of information - as may be seen, for 
instance, in the control of football crowds (see della Porta, 1996; and De Biasi 
1996). The possible influence of this emphasis on information gathering as one 
element in a system of indirect control on the fate of social movements is a 
problem meriting attention.
This element of protest policing in the 1990s, in particular, leads to a 
consideration of whether or not we are confronted with a case of an 
automatically expanding bureaucracy. It can in fact be interpreted as a parallel 
to a development emphasized by police historians, i.e. the thesis that the retreat 
of the police force from its welfare functions was compensated by a progressive 
expansion of the security concept to ever greater risks, so that the new concept 
of police in practice also included the order of the whole society (Jessen, 1995: 
31). Gary Marx observes that agencies that deal with intelligence gathering and 
the prevention of crime or subversion have an inherent tendency to expand'.
3 Since the prime emphasis of the urban units was identification, photography became 
an operational focus. Technological sophistication in this field allowed for expansion in the 
area covered (from half a mile aw'ay) for an extended time (24 hours a day, thanks to infrared 
circuits). ’Like other aspects of the intelligence process, photography became an end in itself, 
a means of intimidating the subject’ (Donner, 1990: 69). Other techniques of control included 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
’[Their] role can be defined in such a way as to create an appetite that can never 
be satiated’ (1979, 112). Referring to the control of protest in the United States 
in the 1960s and 1970s, he adds:
Factors that explain the origin of a phenomenon may not necessarily explain its 
continuance. Thus the origin of government programs for social movement 
intervention generally lies in events that most members of a society would define as 
crisis or a serious threat. However, the programs can take on a life of their own as 
vested interests develop around them, and new latent goals may emerge. Rather than 
social control as repression, deterrence, or punishment, it can become a vehicle for 
career advancement and organizational perpetuation and growth. The management and 
even creation of deviance, rather than its elimination, can become central (Ibid.: 114).
Control agencies would consequently produce political deviants. A similar 
point is raised by David Garret in a study of the FBI involvement against Martin 
Luther King. He suggests that the reasons for the FBI’s ’deviations’ are to be 
found in two concepts: autonomy - as the degree of independence of an 
organization from its formal superiors or other influential actors - and 
homogeneity (white men, with small-town backgrounds, parochial education and 
strongly conservative political views) (Garret, 1981: 224-5).
Although the general trends described can be observed in all countries 
under review, some differences remain visible in a cross-national comparison. 
The very terms of the British debate on ’militarization’ suggest that the civilian 
character of the ’bobby’ is more deeply rooted than critics tend to concede.4 
With respect to underenforcement of the law, the degree of toleration of law­
breaking appears to be higher in countries such as Italy and France where the 
discretionary power of the police is greater, than in a country like Germany 
where legal constraints are more effective. The internal differences between 
French-speaking and German-speaking cantons in Switzerland, analysed by 
Dominique Wisler and Hanspeter Kriesi (1996), appear to confirm this trend. So 
too, the degree of formalization of negotiation practices show considerable 
variance: rather informal in Italy, more formalized in Germany, fairly formalized
4 For a ’continental’ observer, the use of the term ’militarization’ in this debate does not 
seem wholly appropriate. When we speak about a ’militarized’ police force on the continent, 
based on historical examples, we are referring to a paramilitary, militia-type police force, with 
a hierarchical military organization, complete with battle training and deploying heavy military 
weapons, etc. Protective clothing, helmets, shields and deployment in closed formation would 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
in Great Britain. Constraints on the use of information-gathering techniques also 
vary. The Italian case, for instance, seems to be characterized by a lack of limits 
and controls on information-gathering activities by the Digos (the political 
police), which functions as an ’epistemological’ organ of the state, with the role 
of collecting information on all the political actors and interest groups and 
having a special direct relationship with the government (see della Porta 1996; 
for historical tradition, Reiter 1996). These remaining differences highlight the 
need for further comparative and focused research.
II. A MODEL FOR THE EXPLANATION OF PROTEST POLICING 
STYLES
How to explain the cross-national and infra-national differences in protest 
policing styles as well as their evolution in time? Figure 2 provides an outline 
of the different analytical levels that appear to be relevant in answering these 
questions.
[Figure 2 approx, here]
First of all, protest policing styles are influenced by the political system - 
in particular, by what researchers of social movements have defined as the 
’Political Opportunity Structure’(POS).5 If we examine the POS, a first 
analytical level refers to the stable opportunities in which a certain style of 
policing develops. Institutional features - such as police organization, the nature
5 In his pivotal study on political opportunities in American cities, Eisinger (1973) 
focused on access to the political system. Subsequent empirical studies considered additional 
variables, such as electoral instability (Piven and Cloward, 1977), the availability of allies and 
the tolerance for protest among the elite (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977), and the influence of the 
political process (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982). Tarrow (1983) integrated these empirical 
observations in the theoretical framework for his study of protest cycles in Italy. In Tarrow’s 
framework, the components of the POS are the degree of access to political institutions, the 
degree of stability/instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of 
potential allies (Tarrow, 1983: 28), and - in a later work (Tarrow, 1989: 35; see also Tarrow, 
1994) - political conflicts among and within elites. In the 1980s, several scholars referred to 
the concept of political opportunity structure in a number of case studies and cross-national 
comparisons, often adding new variables to the original set (in particular, Brand, 1985; 





























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
of the judiciary, law codes, constitutional rights, and so on - may play an 
important role in defining the opportunities for and constraints on protest 
policing, as they set the conditions for the actual protest policing strategies. 
Moreover, aspects of the political culture, particularly those referring to 
conceptions of the state and citizens’ rights, have similarly important effects 
(Brand, 1985; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1991). Police studies have suggested that 
the very conditions of policing bring about the development of a particular 
police culture, including a series of stereotypes about disorders.
In addition to the relatively stable context, policing styles depend on a 
second, more ’volatile’ set of political opportunities. Various collective actors, 
in fact, put forward their interests or opinions, forming what Kriesi (1989) refers 
to as a ’configuration of power’. First of all, the government defines some 
general lines on how protest should be handled. Moreover, social movements 
intervene on issues relating to citizens’ rights and police tasks - they organize 
protest actions to denounce police brutality, they demand more democracy. 
Political parties, interest groups, trade unions and voluntary associations conflict 
or cooperate with each other on the issue of how to police protest. Like-minded 
actors take sides on the issue, forming on the one hand, law and order coalitions 
and on the other, civil rights coalitions (della Porta, 1994). The media are part 
of this picture, partially as a ’spokesperson’ of one or the other coalition, and 
partially following an ’autonomous’ logic.
The impact of the stable opportunities and the more volatile ones on 
protest policing styles are filtered by police knowledge - that is, the police’s 
construction of external reality, collectively and individually - which we consider 
to be the main intervening variable between structure and action. The influence 
of institutional characteristics of the police, police culture, governments and 
public opinion on protest policing finds a concrete expression only in so far as 
it becomes part of the knowledge of the police. This level of analysis is all the 
more important when institutional actors enjoy - as is the case with the police - 
a high degree of discretionary power.
a) Institutional Characteristics of the Police and Protest Policing Styles
One of the institutional variables relevant to police behaviour is 
constituted by the legal framework, including legislation on constitutional rights 
(right of movement, right of expression), defendants’ rights (preventive 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
interrogate a defendant), and prisoners’ rights (privacy, contact with the external 
world). The Brokdorf decision of the German federal Constitutional Court shows 
the extent to which legal decisions can open new spaces for protestors and 
restrict the range for police intervention (see Winter 1996). A contrary dynamic 
was created by the failure of the Italian Parliament to revise the fascist police 
laws, which remained on the books until the mid-1950s, effectively obstructing 
legal popular protest and facilitating a wide range of police interventions (see 
Reiter 1996). The final turning-point for a democratic policing of protest in post- 
Franco Spain came about in 1983 with the new law on meeting and 
demonstration rights (see Jaime Jimenez 1996).
A second institutional variable relevant to police behaviour is the 
organizational structure of the police. Particularly pertinant questions on the 
characteristics of police organizations refer to (a) centralization (How much 
power do decentralized units have? How powerful is the central government?) 
(b) accountability (Are there special bodies for protest control? special courts for 
police crimes? Do the police have the right to ’shoot to kill’?); and (c) 
militarization (How dependent are the police on the Defence Ministry? Do they 
live in barracks? Are they part of the army? How great is the emphasis on 
’discipline’? What type of armament do they use? Are the police unionized?).6
The effects of these features of police organization on police styles appear 
to be contradictory, varying according to the historical-political context. 
According to Geary, centralization undermined the use of police forces as an 
employer’s private army in Great Britain at the beginning of this century and led 
to a more impartial style of law enforcement (Geary, 1985: 123). The fact, 
however, that the centralization process was initiated at the same time as the 
Labor Party won the majority in some local councils also indicates that 
centralization can have different aims.
Opinions also differ on the effects of centralization on police 
accountability. In a study of the police and labour disputes in England and 
Wales in the first four decades of this century, Jane Morgan (1987) suggested 
that one effect of centralization is a reduction of the accountability of the police
6 Some characteristics of the secret services and the judiciary can also be of relevance 
to protest policing. For instance, the specialization of the secret services in internal versus 
external security and their relative dependence on the military are also important factors in 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
to the democratic bodies. To the contrary, P.A.J. Waddington, studying the 
British police in the 1980s, observed: ’Local control would not guarantee that 
the police would be employed in ways that liberal and radical critics would like’ 
(Waddington, 1991: 134).7
Analyses of the effects of militarization on the police have similarly 
drawn contradictory conclusions.8 In general, a militarily organized police force 
is considered to be more prone to brutality since it implies a hierarchical 
organization with ’blind’ obedience to order. Looking at the evolution of the 
British police, however, P.A.J. Waddington noted that militarization, with its 
implication of stricter control on rank and file officers, could actually help 
prevent brutality. As he observed:
When police are now deployed in public order situations they are no longer an 
assembly of individuals, but are formed into squads under a hierarchy of command 
akin to military formations.... As such, they are more formidable, giving the authorities 
a potentially much more powerful instrument for repression, if they choose to use it. 
At the same time, there is a compensating advantage for protesters in deploying police 
in this manner: they act as a disciplined body ... it means that greater control, 
supervision and, therefore, discipline can be maintained (Ibid., 136).
On the same point, Reiner (1991, 54-5) remarked:
There is an important issue here which critics of the police have not reflected on 
enough. In violent confrontations, a "non-militaristic" response by police (i.e. without 
adequate training, manpower, coordination, and defensive or even offensive 
equipment) could mean that injuries will be multiplied. This doesn’t just mean injuries 
to the police, but also to others who will suffer from undisciplined and excessive 
violence from constables who lose their cool or their courage.
Gary Marx (1972) also noted that a non-militaristic organization of the American 
police had probably contributed to their excessive use of force during the riots 
of the late 1960s.
7 Waddington added, ’Police in countries like the USA, who were under local political 
control and where citizens were protected by a Bill of Rights, saw more, not less, violence’ 
(1991: 134-5).
8 Jessen (1995: 30) recalls that a partial militarization of the police was the price to be 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
Our own research indicates, first of all, that the problems of centralization 
and militarization take on different dimensions in old and new democracies. It 
can be stated that an authoritarian or totalitarian regime is inconceivable without 
a militarized and centralized police. In the periods of transition to democracy in 
Italy, Spain, and Hungary (respectively, Reiter, 1996; Jaime Jimenez, 1996; and 
Szabo and Szikinger 1995), reformist pressure was especially directed against 
these organizational features. This was not only because the dominant police 
model of the victors of the Cold War as well as of World War II was the Anglo- 
Saxon one, it was also because police decentralization and demilitarization were 
considered as necessary in order to ensure democratic accountability. As the 
example of Italy shows, failure to modify the centralized and militarized 
structures of the police forces emerging from an authoritarian or totalitarian 
regime can result in a circle of continuities, only broken by a complete 
generational turnover. The Spanish experience offers a more successful, if 
cautious, attempt to transform the Francoist security forces into a democratic 
police. The Italian police reform, which finally took place at the beginning of 
the 1980s, provides a further example of the contribution that organizational 
changes (such as demilitarization, recruitment of women police officers) can 
make towards an ’opening up’ of a police force (see della Porta 1996).
The argument in old democracies seems to be conducted on a different 
level. The general trend towards a ’softer’ protest policing style developed in all 
the countries dealt with herein, regardless of different levels of centralization and 
militarization of the respective police forces (although a high level might have 
had a retarding effect). The practical impact of different degrees of centralization 
and militarization on police deployment and intervention in concrete public order 
cases has not yet been the subject of comparative research. However, the 
contributions of Fillieule and Jobard (1996) on France and of Waddington 
(1996) on England suggest that militarization and centralization are important 
elements in influencing protest policing styles when the police, to use 
Waddington’s expression, have decided ’to die in a ditch’. In this case a 
centralized police force with paramilitary capacities will be a far more 
formidable instrument than a decentralized and civilian one. As a body they may 
tend to intervene more aggressively, even though a centralized and military 
organization will allow the leadership to exercise greater restraining control over 
the officers on the ground until the moment of intervention. Comparative 
research is needed to ascertain whether the same mechanisms can be found in 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The trend towards greater uniformity among the different European police 
forces is also visible as far as organization is concerned. In their comparative 
analysis, Funk, Kauss and von Zabem (1980) singled out increasing similarities 
in the organizational models of national police forces. In particular, they 
described a process of growing differentiation, with the development of 
independent units; specialization, with a functional definition of the particular 
tasks these units must perform; and professionalization, with an emphasis on 
police formation and training, together with the diffusion of technological 
knowledge. The declining importance of a structural hierarchy and the 
deployment of organs specialized in improving police knowledge on external 
reality are the outcomes of greater attention paid to prevention. Increased police 
powers in the collection and storage of information made this process possible 
{Ibid.\ 22-24). The effects of these trends on protest policing, however, cannot 
simply be defined in terms of more tolerant or more repressive tendencies. As 
far as centralization is concerned, differentiation and specialization bring about 
the autonomization of certain units, which enables insulation from political 
pressures but is also characterized by centralized hierarchies. As for 
accountability, while the formal openings of the police towards society may be 
broader, professionalization and specialization may reduce the possibility of 
external control. Finally, in terms of militarization, we observe a ’civilization’ 
of the police, but at the same time there is also a development of specialized, 
highly professional, militarily-trained units to deal with disorders.
b) Police Culture and Protest Policing Styles
Although less formalized, the political culture of the different countries 
under review and the occupational culture of their police forces also constitute 
stable opportunities. Together with the organizational features, they provide the 
long-term underlying influences on protest policing styles. Kriesi applied to 
social movements the concept of national strategies of conflict resolution, 
elaborated in the analysis of industrial conflicts:9 ’National strategies set the 
informal and formal rules of the game for the conflict’ (1989: 295). Traditions 
are, in fact, embedded not only in laws but also in the political culture. Protest
9 Scharpf (1984: 57) defined this concept as ’an overall understanding, among those who 





























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
policing seems to be particularly sensitive to the cultural understanding o f civil 
rights and police power."1 In particular, the ’rootedness' o f a democratic 
culture seems to have important consequences on the reactions of elites to 
emergent challengers, and vice versa. Both in Italy and Germany the institutional 
and emotional legacy of pre-war fascist mass movements and their ’legal 
revolutions’ was reflected - well into the 1970s - in a ’weak’ acceptance of 
certain democratic rights. Similarly, real or imagined continuities with the fascist 
regimes generated a climate of distrust among challengers. Escalation often 
resulted from the state’s lack of confidence in democratic protest combined with 
the protestors’ lack of confidence in the democratic state institutions. Thus, 
protest was perceived as a threat to democracy by the institutions, and state 
reactions were perceived as a sign of fascism by the movement activists (della 
Porta, 1995: Ch. 3). Generally speaking, however, the post-war years in Europe 
saw a continuous development and strengthening of a democratic political 
culture, which influenced the police and contributed to the emergence of the new 
protest policing styles.
In the analysis of police behaviour, sociological research developed the 
concept of police culture. In seeking an explanation of policing styles, past 
research on the police - based mainly on ethnographic approaches to urban 
subdivisions of police at work - emphasized certain characteristics of the 
professional culture and, especially, of the operational culture widespread among 
officers. In his seminal work, Skolnick (1966: 231) suggested that the policeman 
understands his role as ’craftsman rather than legal actor ... skilled work rather 
than civil servant obliged to subscribe to the rule of the law’. Maureen Cain 
(1973) observed, in her research on the English police, that constables were 
oriented mainly towards crime-fighting, although only a minor portion of their 
time was devoted to this task. This explained why they considered ’making an 
arrest’ as the main action of ’good policing’. Various studies have converged in 
indicating that, because of the very characteristics of their job, policemen 
develop such attitudes as a tendency to secretive behaviour and a lack of 
confidence in the external world (Rubistein, 1973; Manning, 1979; Holdaway, 
1984). 10
10 For instance, recalling the negative political consequences of the police killing 
demonstrators in February 1934, Monjardet (1990: 214-5) suggested that the French police 
are still trained to consider demonstrator not as an enemy, but as a temporary adversary, and 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Some characteristics of the police culture have been noted as facilitating 
repressive attitudes. Commenting upon Lord Scarman’s suggestion (in his 1981 
report on the Brixton riots) to give greater consideration to the police officer 
who must maintain harmony in the community, Benyon (1984) observes that the 
commonly-held macho attitudes among rank and file policemen leads them to 
privilege crime fighting - the excitement of big white cars and flashing blue 
lights (Reiner, 1982) - over peace-keeping. Analysing the policing of the British 
miners’ strike in the 1980s, Sarah McCabe and Peter Wallington suggested that 
since police activity tends to be tedious (waiting for something that almost never 
happens), the protests of the 1960s and 1970s may have produced some 
excitement among police officers (McCabe and Wallington, 1988: 43). 
According to Lipset (1971: 29), the general job experiences of policemen 
’enhance the possibility that whatever authoritarian traits they bring from their 
social background will increase rather than decrease.... In general, the 
policeman’s job requires him to be suspicious of people, to prefer conventional 
behavior, to value toughness.’ Policemen tend to see themselves surrounded by 
a hostile world which, especially in combination with certain organizational 
features like militarization, can lead to isolation from society and aggressive 
feelings against those who are perceived as "diverse".
Two aspects, in particular, of the police culture generated by the work 
experience of policemen have important repercussions on protest policing. As 
already mentioned, the police, although bound by the law, form an institution 
with great discretionary power. This fact is worth underlining not only for the 
institution as a whole, but also for the individual policeman on the beat. 
Historical changes, even the obligation to follow the legality principle and to 
report any violation of the law, did not in practice alter much the situation. Most 
police interventions and sanctions continued to be triggered by situative 
moments, prejudice, stereotypes and other imponderabilia and depended only to 
a lesser extent on the bureaucratic transposition of well-defined rules (Jessen, 
1995: 32fi). The need to take on-the-spot decisions about whether to intervene 
or not makes policemen develop stereotypes about people and situations 
perceived as creating trouble or representing a danger. What is relevant about 
these stereotypes is that they become a kind of guideline for police intervention. 
A. and M. Brogden (1982: 242), for instance, revealed the role of police images 
of Liverpool’s Toxteth district in defining the ’tough’ policing of the area that 
eventually led to riots in 1981: Tn post-World War II years the district (known 
as Liverpool 8), had become allegorized in the demonic ideology of the local 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
for example, the current Chief Constable had claimed that at some future date 
an "army of occupation" may be required to control it’. This image justified a 
’pro-active’ patrolling of the district, using such provisions as the ’sus’ (which 
allowed for arrest if the patrolling officers believed that an individual was about 
to embark on a felony) and the ’stops’ (a local by-law which permitted a 
patrolling officer to stop and search an individual whom he regarded as a 
suspect). As Brogden and Brogden commented, ’The vast majority of recorded 
stops involve the harassment of individuals against whom no charge is 
eventually laid ... The victims are selected for the stop procedures on the basis 
of stereotypes inculcated by force tradition, by occupational culture, and 
according to the guidance of police training manuals ...’ (Ibid.: 245).
The long-term continuities in the conduct of policemen and the practice 
of policing resulting from these characteristics of police culture have been 
repeatedly stressed (Ludtke, 1992: 20). Recent research, however, tends to view 
with increasing scepticism the notion of an immutable police culture. Styles of 
conflict management, though surely resilient to a certain extent, change with 
time. As was observed, for instance, in a comparison of state responses to the 
anti-nuclear movements, traditionally exclusionary states may adopt very flexible 
tactics in order to avoid escalation, while traditionally inclusive states may use 
repression (Flam, 1994: 345). Historically relevant events become turning-points: 
in learning from past mistakes, collective actors develop new strategies (della 
Porta, 1995, Ch. 3). Together with the transformation in the police environment, 
some features of the police’s professional culture may also be changing. Such 
trends as a demilitarization of the police and their professionalization may be 
reflected in a higher class background, as well as in an increasing integration 
into society. Although policemen still tend to consider themselves as ’craftsmen’, 
an increasing emphasis on training, and a shift in its content, may also have 
effected changes in the police culture. Cross-national differences in the 
development of these phenomena may be one reason for the existing cross­
national differences in protest policing in the countries under review.
c) Governments and Protest Policing Styles
The evolution of protest policing may be influenced in the long run by 
stable institutional and cultural opportunities and constraints. The relevant 
changes over time suggest, however, that in addition to this stable context 
protest policing is also dependent upon the ’volatile’ configuration of power. As 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
neutral law enforcement agency independent of political influence. However, 
there seems little doubt that the Government does influence the policing of 
industrial disputes both in terms of the overall approach and in terms of 
particular operational decisions’ (1985: 125-6). In fact, the degree o f political 
control on protest policing, which varies cross-nationally and over time, 
influences police styles. Political control on the police can, however, play in 
different directions. While several examples may be cited of conflicts between 
a liberal city mayor and his/her more conservative police in American cities, 
there are also several examples of political authorities requesting a reluctant 
police to engage in more repression."
Shifts in the policing of protest - or techniques of repression - have often 
been traced to changes in the government’s make-up. In his model of the 
determinants of repression in the United States, Goldstein (1978) considered the 
ideological position of the President as the most important variable. Several 
historical examples indicate that the policing of protest was an issue on which 
parties did in fact polarize along the traditional left-right cleavage. Left-wing 
parties, with vivid memories of state repression of the labour and socialist 
movements, tended to rally in favour of civil liberties; conservative parties, 
fearful of losing votes to parties further to their right, often advocated law and 
order. A comparative study of Italy and Germany (della Porta, 1995) shows that, 
in general, protest policing was ’softer’ and more tolerant when the left was in 
government, whereas the conservative governments were inclined to use ’harder’ 
tactics. In Italy the centre-left governments of the 1960s broke with the tradition 
of allowing the police to shoot at demonstrators. In Germany, the first SPD-FDP 
Brandt government (1969-72) developed a more tolerant style of protest policing 
and liberalized laws concerning public marches and citizens’ rights. In his study 
on the policing of industrial disputes in Great Britain, Roger Geary attributed the 
shift from a ’hard style’ to a ’soft style’ of protest policing - a shift that he 
situated in about 1910 - to political considerations that constrained the behaviour 
of the authorities, in particular to the fact that ’the Liberals, in order to maintain 
a majority over the conservatives, frequently had to rely on the support of Labor 
and Irish nationalist Members of Parliament’ (1985: 117). In the 1980s, a partial 
roll-back to a ’harder’ protest policing was instead connected with the political 
choices of the conservative government led by Mrs. Thatcher {Ibid.: Ch. 7). 1
11 This was particularly visible, for instance, in the policing of the student movement in 
Berlin, when the police leadership intervened in the political arena and in the media, stressing 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
It would, however, be inaccurate to claim that left-wing governments are 
always more tolerant of protest than conservative governments. Indeed, there 
seem to be periods in which the main parties do not greatly differ in their 
position on internal security policy (for instance, on Germany see Funk, 1990). 
One possible reason for this is that protest policing is, in fact, a tricky issue for 
left-wing governments. The comparative research on Italy and Germany referred 
to above (della Porta, 1995) indicated, for instance, that left-wing governments 
often have to face difficult law and order campaigns launched by the 
conservative opposition (as happened in Germany under Chancellor Brandt). It 
is especially when the left feels the need to legitimate itself as ’fit-to-govem’ 
that it has to make concessions to the hard-line proponents of law and order. 
Such compromises not only inevitably disappoint social movement activists 
(usually to the advantage of the most radical wings), they also elicit internal 
criticism. Just as left-wing governments are not automatically lenient towards 
protest, so too conservatives in power do not always implement repressive 
policies. For instance, the swing from left to right in the state government amidst 
the turmoil of the Berliner squatters’ movement in 1981 did not interrupt the 
negotiations for a political solution, although some incidents did escalate into 
violence simply because the squatters anticipated a harder reaction by the 
conservative government (CILIP, 1981).
As the case studies presented in this series indicate, government obviously 
retains a great potential influence on protest policing. The example of Italy in 
the immediate post-war period shows the extent to which orders from the central 
government can affect protest policing at the local level. In this case the 
government not only named ’the enemy’, but also outlined the types of police 
intervention to be exercised and evaluated the results achieved (1996). For both 
France and England, Fillieule and Jobard (1996) emphasize the strong influence 
maintained by political powers, albeit with perceivable differences, on the 
question of when to intervene. Reporting on the criticism voiced by police 
officers on this interference, they propose to speak of political antagonism rather 
than police antagonism in those cases where the government, basing their 
decisions on political considerations, order an antagonistic police intervention. 
The influence of government on protest policing styles also makes itself felt in 
a more general way, as is shown by the existence of two protest policing ’lines’ 
(one of Social-Democratic-governed Nordrhein-Westfalen and the other of 
conservative-governed Bavaria) in the Federal Republic of Germany (see Winter 
1996). On the other hand, Waddington (1996), while underlining the influence 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
police, who in the case of an anarchist demonstration in Trafalgar square would 
not be compelled to ’die in the ditch’ by the minister whose actions were 
perceived as arbitrary and partisan.
The recent development towards a ’softer’ protest policing style seems to 
have gone hand in hand with a retreat of government from direct intervention. 
Recent research indicates two connected developments: in general, governments 
tend to leave the technical side of policing protest increasingly to the police, 
who on the other hand increasingly perceive their role in policing social and 
political conflicts as problematic, criticizing politicians for handing responsibility 
over to the police for situations which can be resolved only politically. 
Historically, the absence of instructions on protest policing from the political 
power has led to disorientation among the police, with contrasting consequences 
- in most cases tending more towards apathy than to aggressive activism. In 
serious public order events, the lack of such political guidance might lead to a 
dominance of on-the-ground emotions and to an escalation of the confrontation 
between protestors and police into a win-or-lose battle.
d) Public Opinion and Protest Policing Styles
Government choices on protest policing are sensitive to the pressures of 
various actors. Political parties, interest groups and movement organizations 
express their preferences on protest policing, addressing either their constituency, 
the public or the policy-makers directly. Their discourses are then filtered 
through the media, thereby influencing public opinion.
Protest policing is an issue on which the more radical actors often find 
alliances, leading to the formation of civil rights coalitions. For instance, in his 
research on the policing of industrial disputes in Great Britain, Geary stated: ’In 
the past the use of lethal force against defenceless working people had been 
counterproduct''''' :n several ways. Opposition from a broad section of political 
opinion could be expected and this often proved extremely embarrassing for the 
Government’ (1985: 117). When the police is perceived as ’overreacting’, a 
process of ’solidarization’ is set in motion between those who are the direct 
target of repression and larger - and often more moderate - forces. The reaction 
in England to the Peterloo Massacre in 1819 offers a historical illustration of this 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
protest movement with which many Whigs were willing to associate’ 
(Thompson, 1968: 756).
Moments can occur, however, when the public (or a part of the public) 
ask for a ’tougher’ intervention, and law and order coalitions arise. The 
’majoritarian’ - or more vociferous - public opinion of the day is, in fact, not 
always a ’liberal’ one. Historical examples can readily be located in which hard­
line policies were implemented in response to pressure exerted by law and order 
coalitions. According to Zwerman (1987), the ’harder’ counter-terrorist policies 
of the Reagan administration resulted from the pressure of right-wing groups 
(such as the Moral Majority) on the national government. Thus, ’tough’ police 
intervention may be criticized by some, while appreciated by others. A study on 
the impact on the public of the policing of the 1984-5 miners’ strike in Great 
Britain showed that, while alienating the strikers, the police’s hard line improved 
the image of the police among non-strikers (Green, 1990: Ch. 3). Phases of 
’moral panic’ (Cohen, 1972) have often generated demands for Taw and order’.
The media enter this picture partly as a ’spokesperson’ of one or the other 
coalition and partly with their own ’autonomous’ logic. Media attention to social 
protest seems to have the effect of generating a shift towards more tolerant 
policing. In particular since the seventies, the daily press appeared as more 
critical towards ’touch’ police interventions, and more pluralistic (della Porta 
1994). As we are going to see, the mere presence of journalists, in fact, appears 
to have a de-escalating effect on the police, although the fact that this presence 
does not always discourage the police from a ’hard’ style of intervention is 
testified by the very existence of media coverage of such interventions. There 
are also cases where the media become the promoters of law and order 
campaigns. One example is the coverage by the Springer press, especially the 
tabloid Bild, of the student movement in Germany, most notably in Berlin. 
Furthermore, appreciation of the influence maintained by the media and 
interested coalitions on protest policing styles in contemporary European 
democracies should not lead to an overestimation of their weight in general. 
Although studies on the police in transition phases to democracy show that the 
police are very sensitive and dependent on public support during such periods, 
the Italian case in particular also demonstrates the degree to which even in a 
democracy the police may use repressive policies, despite the opposition of a 
large and well-organized minority (Reiter 1996). This is especially true when the 
police enjoy unlimited government support and receive clear directives, i.e. if 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
a large minority, are outweighed by the possible trouble which could result if 
they fail to follow the government’s orders.
Furthermore, there are indications that media coverage by its very nature 
can work as an agent of escalation. Certain characteristics of news production 
seem to generate a media ’bias’ in favour of the police. As Murdock (1984: 78) 
observed, ’Contrary to the "high" and "low" conspiracy theories favored by some 
critics of the news media, the answer does not lie in interventions from on high 
or in the personal prejudices of journalists and editors, but in the routine 
business of news production and the practical and commercial pressures which 
shape it.’ First among these characteristics is the fact that in news gathering 
journalists rely upon official sources - and among them the police are usually a 
preferred one.12 Not only are police spokesmen given ample space in accounts 
of disorders, even the pictures reflect the police ’point of view’ since, for 
security reasons, they are usually taken from behind the police. A second 
characteristic of the ’business of news production’ that can produce a biased 
image of protestors is the rule that a ’good story’ should focus on the dramatic 
and violent actions, involving large numbers of participants, and not on the 
incidents that originally triggered off such mass events: ’News stories are 
concerned with the immediate and dramatic, with effects rather than cause, with 
surface appearances rather than underlying processes’ (D. Waddington, 1992: 
177). Moreover, ’Topics and events are selected as headline news according to 
their news-worthiness. Hence the emphasis on the dramatic, unexpected and 
negative, the measurement of the significance of negative events in terms of 
damage to people and property’ (Ibid.). Thirdly, like other actors, the press uses 
stereotypes that oppose rampaging crowds to sober citizens, that identify trouble­
makers with hooligan youth, and that (as was the case in the coverage of the
12 Several researchers have pointed out the special relationship between the media and 
the police. ’The police are news’, writes Nigel Fielding (1991: 17). ’A substantial proportion 
of routine media output relates to crime, policing or police. Like the media, the police are 
there every day, reliably producing output, be it direct action, court cases and testimony, 
dealings with government, or press releases. It pays journalists to attend closely to every 
aspect of police business.’ However, ’the journalists are aware that at least some of their 
readership do not like the police. Police practice sells paper just as well as police heroism’ 
(Ibid.). If journalists select information on the basis of ’news value’, there can be room for 
conflicts between the two sides. Fielding also agrees that escalation can be produced by 





























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
Toxteth riots) depict the black population as permanently alien.Ij The need to 
’define the situation’ can push the press to take the view that ’the protesters - 
the violent minority by their acts, the majority by their association - have moved 
outside the realm of politics and into the area of criminal activity'(Ibid.).>A
While not dealing directly with public opinion and the media, recent 
research indicates a growing public stigmatization of coercive police 
management of political demonstrations and social protest. This is at least the 
perception by the police, as we shall see in more detail below. However, public 
opinion seems to be less tolerant of disruptive protest behaviour when other 
protest channels are available (Wisler and Kriesi 1996). Moreover, coercive 
policing is better accepted, or even advocated, if directed against violent 
protestors.
e) The Interaction Between Police and Protestors and Protest Policing Styles
Another variable which undoubtedly influences protest policing styles is 
the interaction between protestors and the police, a dynamic which is not 
restricted to single protest events. Individual incidents may have long-term 
repercussions on police attitudes towards protest. The police also seem to be 
equipped with an elephant’s memory: the history of previous interactions with 
protestors is an important element shaping today’s protest policing.
First of all, the prohibition of a demonstration can set up violent 
dynamics. Research on disorderly demonstrations in London over a period of 134
13 Media are also criticized for the ’copycat’ effects they produce which helps spread 
disorders (although it is possible that contagion is also produced by a change in police 
attitudes). Moreover, ’the notion that riots are fomented by foreign agitators or people 
possessed of "alien" views and bent on undermining the "British way of life"’ has been used 
[by the media] to explain almost every incident of public disorder since the Gordon riots of 
1970’ (Murdock, 1984: 83-4). See also Sumner, 1982.
14 David Waddington lists six main characteristics of the media’s representation of public 
disorders ’I. Underemphasising, excusing, justifying police aggression, 2. Praising police 
"heroism", 3. Exaggerating, dramatizing violence, 4. Emphasizing "wickedness", "bestiality", 
"mindlessness" of dissenters, 5. Decontextualizing and depoliticising violence (denying its 
meaning), 6. Distorting, oversimplifying causes.' The effects would contribute to public 
disorders by ' 1. Failing to highlight/address grievances, 2. Denigrating/vilifying dissenters and 
their claims, 3. Labelling dissenters as "threat" to society, 4. Calling for resolute 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
100 years has shown that ’violence has tended to occur whenever protesters have 
been castigated as "subversive", "unpatriotic", or "communistic"; when their 
activities were likely to prove embarrassing to the government, monarchy or 
"national reputation", or when the demonstration was technically illegal, 
occurring in a defiance of legal prohibition’ (D. Waddington, 1992: 29, emphasis 
added). The implementation of a prohibition to demonstrate is known in fact 
even to the police as a source of violent escalation (Wisler and Barranco, 1996:
7).
Certain police techniques can lead to escalation during interaction with 
demonstrators. The dispersal of crowds, for instance, is a delicate task. As P.A.J. 
Waddington observes, ’Effective dispersal of a crowd requires that the police 
should be able flexibly and rapidly to attend where there is any concentration. 
It is the recognition of this fact that lies at the heart of the strategy of 
"aggressive mobility" which informs public-order policing in most other 
countries, and is particularly associated with Continental and colonial policing 
system’ (1991: 163-4). According to the same author, the main instrument of 
coercive police intervention - the baton charge - easily leads to escalation.
The reason why baton charges are difficult to control is known colloquially in the 
Metropolitan Police as "the red mist". This refers to a potential cocktail of 
psychological conditions which diminishes any person’s self-control, and from which 
the police are not exempt. Baton charges require officers to act aggressively in 
conditions o f relative anonymity ... they may be wearing protective clothing with 
visors to obscure their facial features; and they will almost certainly be acting, not as 
individuals, but as a group. The target of their actions will not be other individuals, 
but an equally anonymous collective - "the crowd", "Them" - who will have insulted 
and physically attacked "Us" - the police. Officers’ anger and frustration will thus have 
been aroused, and a baton charge will allow retaliation in conditions which minimize 
individual responsibility. The violence that the police employ in response is seen, 
certainly by the police themselves, as justified - upholding the law - a feeling that 
inhibits restraint. Baton charge is also physically arousing because of the exertion 
involved. In striking members of the crowd officers are likely to experience pleasure, 
not because they are sadists, but because they will undergo a reduction in physical 
stress which is experienced as pleasurable and which will encourage them to repeat the 
aggressive action. Psychologically, these are conditions virtually designed to encourage 
aggression and violence. Added to this volatile mixture, the human physique makes 
it extremely difficult to strike in a manner other than that which will inflict serious 
injury. Whilst officers are instructed to strike people with their batons only on the 
arms, legs and torso, and are forbidden to hit people on the head, this is an unnatural 
action which is likely to be forgotten in the heat of the moment. The natural 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
Particularly in crowd dispersal, an additional risk of escalation derives 
from organizational dynamics. As Monjardet observed (1990: 217 ff.), there are 
at least three main mechanisms in police intervention that favour escalation: the 
dialectic of centralization and autonomy in police units, the difficulties of 
coordinating the different groups, and uncertainty about the aims of the 
intervention. Although a police force may have well-developed techniques for 
controlling large masses, it may be ill-prepared to isolate and control small 
groups operating within larger crowds (Ibid.. 233). In Italy and Germany (della 
Porta, 1995), certain much criticized ’hard’ police interventions - that eventually 
led to escalation - occurred during peaceful mass demonstrations ’infiltrated’ by 
small radical groups. In such situations, the handling of law and order indeed 
called for a difficult equilibrium between control of the radicals and respect for 
the rights of the moderates. Moreover, especially in Germany in the 1980s, 
claims of police brutality often followed the authorities’ decision to deploy units 
from different states to police protest events. In these cases, lack of coordination 
and a poor knowledge of the territory may have led to the escalation of 
conflicts, even when a strategy of de-escalation had been planned by the police 
leadership.15
If the image of a ’weak’ police - especially when ’promoted’ by political 
entrepreneurs - can produce fear in the public and calls for more ’effective’ 
repression, the impression of having been ’defeated’ will also have important 
consequences within the police. These consequences go beyond immediate 
reactions like promises to take revenge, and extend to tactical and structural 
changes. In Great Britain, a perceived police ’defeat’ during a picketing action 
in Saltey in the 1970s led to the organization of a system of mutual aid between 
the various local police forces as well as to the establishment of a National 
Recording Center. Later on, the visible weakness of the police during the riots 
of the early 1980s allowed for an increasing specialization and armament of the 
’anti rioting’ branches (Waddington, 1996; Reiner, 1996). As Geary (1985: 127) 
has observed, ’It’s only after you have been seen by the public to lose at one 
tactical level that you can escalate to the next level.’
The history of interactions between protestors and police is of great 
importance in explaining protest policing dynamics. Such interactions are the 
concrete expression of the national strategies developed to deal with challengers,





























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
as mentioned above. For the police, the history of their relations with specific 
protest groups constitutes an important element in decisions on tactics to be 
applied. For this reason, the impact of the virtuous circle of less and less 
violence on public demonstrations has to be stressed. These mechanisms, 
however, are already taking us into the category of police knowledge, to which 
we now turn.
g) Police Knowledge and Protest Policing Styles
As police research has often revealed, the police is a bureaucracy with a 
very high degree of discretionality. Several studies have addressed the question 
of police behaviour, explaining the different strategies adopted by police officers 
and/or police units. In particular, a ’situational’ approach relates police choices 
to environmental characteristics, while an ’attitudinal’ approach concentrates 
upon the individual preferences of police officers (for a review see Worden, 
1989). Both approaches share the persuasion that (a) a large degree of discretion 
exists in police behaviour, and (b) there are systematic variations (see, for 
instance, J.Q. Wilson, 1968). As Manning observed, ’Policing tends to be shaped 
by adaptations made by actors to structural patterns, to the reality they perceive, 
construct and maintain’ (1979: 48-9, emphasis added). For a full understanding 
of protest policing styles it is not enough to look at the variables discussed so 
far. We also have to examine police knowledge; that is, the police’s perception 
of their role and of the external reality. For organizational features, police 
culture, governments, public opinion and interaction with protestors to have an 
influence on protest policing styles, their input has to be taken up by the police 
and transformed into knowledge.
Why do we refer to the police’s perception of their role and of external 
reality as ’knowledge’ and not just as ’images’? A first reason is connected with 
the great discretionality that the police enjoy as an organization and as individual 
officers. In a reversal of the mechanism typical of bureaucracies, which sees 
increased discretionary latitude at the top of the hierarchy, the rank and file 
policemen on the spot hold a very extensive ’power of definition’ of the 
situation. Police officers intervene first of all on the basis of their appreciation 
of the situation, and only in the second place on the basis of rules and 
regulations (lessen, 1995: 32f.). In this sense, the police’s perception of external 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
bureaucracy.16 It is not subordinate to rules and regulations contained in written 
manuals, but is at least equally important for the carrying out of police duty, and 
is not restricted to certain shortcuts and tricks of the trade taught by experience.
A second reason for the use of the term ’knowledge’ can be found in the 
range and depth of police knowledge, which is not limited to fleeting images, 
stereotypes and prejudices, but extends to the core problems of protest policing. 
To give an example, Waddington (1996) calls the policing of protest in 
democracies ’intrinsically morally ambiguous: protesters are not criminals, but 
citizens participating in the political process; ... any conflict between protesters 
and the police tends to be a battle of moral equals in which both sides are 
seeking the approval of bystanders’. Interviews with police officers show that 
they are aware, precisely for this reason, that protest policing is a particularly 
delicate task. As a British superintendent observed, ’In our society if we arrest 
a man for stealing everybody else says, "serves him right", but where you get 
into an area where you are arresting a man in relation to his work [i.e. during 
a strike] then there are emotions involved here that are not as clear cut to the 
average guy as they are with the ten commandments for instance’ (in Geary, 
1985: 127).
A third reason for the use of the term ’police knowledge’ lies in the 
interconnection of perceptions of external reality. These perceptions do not 
remain isolated images, but form a body of knowledge. To take the example of 
a feature of the police occupational culture, namely police images about 
protestors and demonstrations: the distinction made by the police between 
’ordinary decent protestors’ and ’professional protestors’, which will be 
discussed in detail later, reflects the institutional pressure, i.e. the political 
impact (Waddington 1996). It is furthermore based on instruction and on past 
work experiences, and also represents an adaptation of general stereotypes 
developed by the police on disorders and disordered behaviour. Moreover, it take 
into account the dynamics of police interaction with some specific groups—since 
’Demonstrators’ and policemen’s images reflect each other. The image the 
demonstrators have of the police will have an impact upon the images the police 
have of the demonstrators’ (McClintock et al., 1974: 102). In the final score, it 
is influenced by the media and public opinion in general, but also by a reflection
16 Max Weber defined ’specialized knowledge’ as the knowledge acquired via a specific 
education, and ’service knowledge’ as the knowledge - available only to the functionaries - 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
on the media coverage of demonstrations. With police knowledge, we refer then 
to the police’s ’construction of the external reality’ (Berger and Luckman, 1966).
The way in which police knowledge translates into a protest policing style 
has been discussed in more detail as far as police stereotypes are concerned. The 
process works for protest policing in the same way as for police work in 
general: ’The action of the police, as a force of social control, depends of course 
on the received order (authorized demonstration or non authorized 
demonstration), but also on the images that the policemen have of those very 
groups they have to police. ... Control or dispersion of the demonstrators will be 
more or less brutal according to this image’ (McClintock et al., 1974: 102). In 
his explanation of the brutal police repression of disorders during the 1968 
Democratic convention in Chicago, Donner (1990: 116) observed that the police 
believed that an army of demonstrators had planned to invade the city (as some 
movement literature had boasted an invasion of the city of between 100,000 and 
200,000 demonstrators, while no more than 5,000 came). They also believed the 
’threats’ disseminated by Yippies as a sort of theatre provocation to ’bum the 
city down’ or flood the city sewers with gasoline or dump LSD in the water 
supply (Ibid. : 116-7).
Stereotypes about protestors may overlap with those of other groups 
usually included in the (socially constructed) definition of public disorders. In 
their analysis of certain examples of public behaviour understood as constituting 
public disorder and in response to which public order law was or could have 
been used (with particular regard to youth gangs, football hooligans, vagrants 
and travelling people, industrial conflict, and inner city riots), Nicola Lacey, 
Celia Wells and Dirk Meure noted the presence of ’recurring themes’: ’These 
recurring themes, although not universal, seem to be ideas of the young, 
"outsiders" such as immigrants, ethnic minority members or "agents 
provocateurs", of those whose lifestyle deviates from the norm, and of 
disadvantaged socio-economic groups as being especially implicated in public 
disorder or as posing a special threat to it ...’ (1990, 71, emphasis added).
In addition to ’old’ stereotypes, some of which like the ’conspiracy 
theory’ enjoy a surprising life-span and vitality, ’new’ ones can emerge during 
waves of protest.17 In Great Britain, in the 1970s and 1980s:
17 Other widespread stereotypes are those of the 'rotten apple' and the 'communist 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
[the] developments in training and the social and political agitation that brought them 
about compelled many police forces to find not only new skills but also new 
stereotypes to supplant, for the uniformed officer at least, the "villain” of the early 
days. These stereotypes derive not only from their own experiences and mythology but 
also from the enemies put before them, from time to time, by popular fears, by the 
media, or by politicians. Thus communists, leftists and subversives of all sorts find 
their place in a hierarchy of awkward citizens who may have to be contained on 
occasion if their assemblies are thought to be unstable or threatening (McCabe and 
Wallington, 1988: 43-4).
Stereotypes about one form of public disorder can spread to others. Taking the 
example of Great Britain again, it was observed that the experiences of the 
1970s in Northern Ireland surfaced in the ’framing’ of the riots of the early 
1980s, and then spread to the policing of the miners’ strike. Commenting on the 
Tactical Options Manual distributed in 1982 to senior police officers in Great 
Britain - a manual that introduced manoeuvres of an essentially military 
character, redirected police methods from the individual-oriented tradition to that 
of the team, and from the reactive tradition to a proactive one - McCabe and 
Wallington (1984: 50) commented:
The style of policing reflected in the Tactical Options Manual was consciously copied 
from the crown control methods developed in colonial police forces (such as Hong 
Kong) and in Northern Ireland. The manual gives little indication of any variation in 
approach where the circumstances of the disorder are an industrial dispute, and it is 
clear that this question was incidental to the perceived need for the manual. While the 
1981 riots may have been the principal catalyst to the drawing up of the manual, and 
perhaps future urban riots the main intended occasion for its practical implementation, 
in the event the first full-scale use of the type of maneuvers envisaged was during the 
miners’ strike, most spectacularly during the confrontations at Orgreave.... The 
experience of the riots and the developments in organization and management which 
they forced upon the police were largely instrumental in making effective the police 
control of the coal-fields during the twelve months of the miners’ strike (McCabe and 
Wallington, 1984: 48-9).
More recent research has indicated however that policemen have quite 
complex images of demonstrators. Helmut Willelms and his collaborators (1988) 
discovered that policemen have surprisingly little knowledge of protestors’ 
motives. Nevertheless, the image of demonstrators was found to be a complex 
one, in which ’peaceful demonstrators’ are set in opposition to ’hooligans’. 
According to the policemen, ’Peaceful demonstrators have a pragmatic interest, 
and a clear aim, for which they engage themselves with a lot of involvement and 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
are peaceful demonstrators ... with a direct interest in the conflict ... They are 
willing to discuss, they are well informed’ (Willelms et al., 1988: 153). The 
violent hooligans, instead, ’are not interested in the topic of the conflict, but 
only in rioting, in reducing their aggression in the struggle with the police. They 
are described as destructive and misinformed. They travel from demonstration 
to demonstration, are probably supported and financed by wire-pullers ... In 
comparison with the peaceful demonstrators, they are a relatively small group, 
many of them are very young, and for this reason are easy to influence. 
Normally, they are not interested in discussions’ (Ibid.: 153-4).18
The police distinction between ’good’ and ’bad’ demonstrators is based 
on their conception of ’legitimate’ protest. Legitimate protest, linked to social 
problems and organized by people aiming to make themselves heard in order to 
solve the problems, is sharply contrasted to protests by ’professional 
demonstrators’, who upset public order because they enjoy provocation and 
revolt. This distinction is taken up by P.A.J. Waddington: ’good’ or ’genuine’ 
protestors, who are interested in a specific objective that they mobilize around, 
and ’the opposition’. The former are considered to be in good faith and, in 
general, protest for good reason; the latter are trouble-makers. ’"Genuine 
protesters" consisted of ordinary people who rarely protest, but felt strongly 
about a specific issue and wished to express their grievance. "The opposition" 
were the "rent-a-mob" of the extreme left, who protested about virtually 
everything, which, in police eyes, disqualified them from genuinely feeling 
strongly about anything’ (P.A.J. Waddington, 1994: 112-3). Furthermore, those 
who the police define as ’genuine protestors’ rarely cause any trouble, which 
would translate into an excessive workload for the policemen deployed.
In the Italian case, the police sees the principle actors producing disorder 
in the 1990s as motivated not by political beliefs - considered to be ’noble’ ends 
- but by an impulse towards ’hooliganism’, which reflects the existence of social 
problems (see della Porta, 1996; and De Biasi, 1996),. In fact, a distinction is 
made between ’good’ demonstrators, who protest to achieve comprehensible 
ends and are well organized in their actions, and ’bad’ demonstrators, whose 
objectives appear to be more confused and whose actions are disorganized. 
Among the former category are ’workers’ or ’family men’ - according to the
18 A third group is also individuated: a group that is ready for violence, but only under 
certain conditions. This group considers violence as a means to be used when peaceful protest 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
definitions of interviewees - who demonstrate in defence of their jobs or in 
favour of union claims, and who have both a long experience of demonstrations 
and a noteworthy capacity to manage them. Among the second category are the 
hooligans and young people from social centres, whose demands are considered 
at best to be ’confused’, and whose behaviour often appears to be 
’unpredictable’19.
The police pass their judgement on the degree of legitimacy of a specific 
protest form or protest group, a judgement which inevitably influences their 
reactions, without consulting manuals or waiting for explicit orders from 
political powers. As Nigel Fielding observed, ’Discretion is the enduring 
problem. Few mothers and children have been prosecuted for disrupting traffic 
while demanding pedestrian crossings, a very common protest in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. Obstruction and even conspiracy charges could have been applied, if 
the group were not one to whom the police judged most people to be 
sympathetic’ (1991: 77). It should be emphasized here that as far as the police 
are concerned, strategies of ’containment’ - which imply a considerable 
underenforcement of the law - also bring with them problems of legitimation. 
Officially, the police justify their role as being merely one of ’technical’ 
application of the law. When strategies of non-coercive control of public order 
are used, the selective application of the law raises the need to justify a 
discretionary power; as a consequence, the image of law enforcement being of 
a purely technical nature is weakened. The development of technical means for 
gathering information serves to ’negate’ the existence of a discretionary power, 
through the pressing of charges for crimes not immediately ’punished’.
Police knowledge intervenes as a filter on all the levels of Figure 2, not 
only for the occupational culture of the police from which the example of 
stereotypes discussed above was taken. The presumed impact of organizational 
features such as centralization and militarization on police officers’ perception 
of their role fuelled police reform efforts in various countries. As far as the legal 
framework is concerned, the underenforcement of the law, singled out as one of 
the most significant tendencies characterizing protest policing in the 1990s, 
provides a clear example of the way in which police knowledge acts as a filter. 
For instance, in his discussion of the Brokdorf-Urteil of the German federal 
Constitutional Court, Martin Winter emphasizes that it was the reception of this 
legal decision by the police which gave it its impact on protest policing.




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Police knowledge works in the same way in terms of the impact that the 
political powers have on protest policing styles practised in specific cases. 
Waddington underlines the degree of police autonomy even in the face of 
ministerial decisions, which in the case of the already-mentioned anarchist 
demonstration was revealed in the police response to what they perceived as the 
abuse of institutional power for non-institutionalized purposes. The impact of 
police knowledge, however, runs deeper. It is again Waddington who emphasizes 
that ’institutional power is refracted through the lens of how the police define 
their task’. The London police do not need a specific order to protect the 
memorial to Britain’s war dead from desecration, their knowledge of the 
consequences for their image should it be destroyed is sufficient. In Germany, 
there are cases of vorauseilender Gehorsam (’obedience in advance’) (Winter 
1996). In countries like Italy, where the police have a tradition of political 
dependence, the efforts of the police are oriented towards perceiving ’which way 
the wind is blowing’. As indicated in della Porta’s contribution, the 
governmental change in Italy in 1994 led to a period of extreme caution for the 
police as they waited for political directives on the management of public order.
The police are not only conscious of the presence of the mass media at 
demonstrations, but are also knowledgeable about the mechanisms of media 
coverage. According to a British chief constable, the growth of the media 
accounted for the decline of the baton charge as a public order tactic, since ’to 
read about a baton-charge does not have the same impact as seeing it ... The 
development of the media must have had a tremendous effect on tactical 
thinking. You can imagine the significance, suddenly literally millions of people 
are able to see for themselves what happens. I’m convinced that’s why baton 
charges are no longer used. You can imagine the public outcry if people saw on 
television the police baton-charging pickets’ (in Geary, 1985: 129). Along the 
same line, a British superintendent added: ’So we are very much aware of the 
media which controls to some extent police action. So that action, when it’s seen 
on the film, has got to be seen to be reasonable. If we act unreasonably, then 
yes, we could alienate the public, not in the issue, but in the way that we deal 
with them. ... We have got to protect our image’ (Ibid.: 130).
To conclude this discussion of police knowledge, it is worth underlining 
that a study of this subject must confront certain difficulties, beside the fact that 
it is not only written knowledge which is being analysed. An analysis of 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
police knowledge do not exist.20 The control exercised over the police by 
political authorities, for instance, is perceived differently on different levels of 
the police hierarchy. In the British case, the more attentive awareness of senior 
officers seems to have had a restraining effect on rank and file members. As one 
inspector observed, ’These senior officers, they are into this low profile, softly, 
softly, community relations approach, and let these strikers get away with just 
about every offence short of murder.... We ought to just once move in hard - 
that’s all it would take and we’d have no more problems. These senior officers, 
well, they are too scared to do that. They are worried about questions being 
asked in Parliament, about their chances of promotion, about being criticized, 
about whether they’d have to explain to Scarman why they did this, that, or the 
other, about whether the Home Secretary would call for a report, etc., etc.’ (in 
Geary, 1985: 125). Furthermore, the police themselves do not appear to reflect 
critically on their construction of external reality as knowledge, interpreting it 
as ’experience’ and ’on the job learning’. Police knowledge is therefore probably 
shifting and possibly contradictory, different for different levels of the police 
hierarchy and for different police branches.
III. ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
PROTEST POLICING
We can turn now to the effects of protest policing on social movements, 
and particularly on protest tactics. The social science literature provides us with 
several hypotheses on this point. Some scholars have stated that a reduction in 
repression facilitates the development of social movements. According to 
Skocpol (1979), social revolutions are triggered by political crises, which 
weaken political control and the state’s capacity for repression. McAdam (1982) 
also indicated that reduction in repression acted as a facilitating factor, 
specifically for the civil rights movement. A high degree of repression has often 
been associated with radical behaviour on the part of challengers. Goldstein 
concluded his comparative analysis of political repression in 19th-century Europe 
by observing that ’those countries that were consistently the most repressive, 
brutal, and obstinate in dealing with the consequences of modernization and 
developing working-class dissidence reaped the harvest by producing oppositions 
that were just as rigid, brutal, and obstinate’ (Goldstein, 1983: 340). Kitschelt 
(1985: 302-3) hypothesized that an illiberal political culture will push




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
movements to adopt antagonistic and confrontational positions. A comparative 
research of the German and the Italian cases (della Porta, 1995) indicated that 
a more tolerant, selective and ’soft’ protest policing style favours the emergence 
and diffusion of protest. Repression often produces a shift in the aims of the 
protest itself, as Edward Escobar noted in a study of the Chicano movement in 
Los Angeles: ’In a dialectical relationship, while the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s tactics partially achieved the goal of undermining the Chicano 
movement, the police and their tactics became issues around which Chicano 
activists organized the community and increased the grass-roots participation in 
movement activity’ (Escobar, 1993: 1485). The reaction to police repression is 
a change in the protest focus from the single issue to the meta-issue of protest 
rights.
Other scholars, however, have reported less clear-cut outcomes. In a 
review of studies on the American protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, 
John Wilson (1976) observed that research indicates at certain times a 
radicalization of those groups exposed to police violence, at other times their 
retreat from unconventional actions. Similarly, contradictory findings can be 
integrated into a more coherent explanation if one assumes a curvilinear 
relationship between the challengers’ violence and the repressiveness of 
authorities (see Neidhardt, 1989).21 In della Porta’s comparative study of Italy 
and Germany (della Porta, 1995, Ch. 3), it emerged that more repressive, diffuse 
and ’brutal’ techniques of policing tend to discourage the mass and peaceful 
protest while fuelling the more radical fringe. In Italy, for instance, radicalization 
processes in the social movements coincided with a period of harder repression, 
during which police again killed demonstrators at public marches. Moreover, the 
belief that the institutions were involved in a ’dirty war’ worsened the 
relationship between movement activists and state representatives. Conversely,
21 The complex relations between repression and social movement activities can probably 
be explained if we take into account the fact that protest policing influences both the costs and 
(expected) benefits of collective action. First, state repression represents one of the most 
relevant (potential) costs of taking part in collective behaviour. Even if other costs and 
benefits are taken into account - and even if collective behaviour is not always ’rational’ - the 
weight of the cost defined by state repression would be difficult to overstate. But the form of 
repression influences the same grievances that spark protest in the first place, for example, by 
creating ’injustice frames’ (Gamson, Fireman and Rytina, 1982). Therefore, the more 
’repressive’ the state, the higher the potential rewards of collective action, since the 
’punishment’ of the unfair state would become part of the expected rewards, and the need to 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
the relative absence of radical strategies in Germany during the first half of the 
1970s reflected the reformist attitude of the social-liberal government and a 
tolerant, selective and ’soft’ protest policing. In both countries, the highest levels 
of repression coincided with a shrinking of the more politically-oriented wing 
of the movements, a decline that indirectly helped the most radical behaviour to 
prevail - as was the case, in particular, in Italy in the 1970s. The lower degree 
of violence during protest events in the following decade corresponded with an 
increasing tolerance for different forms of protest.
A last question relates to the reciprocal adaptation o f police and 
protestors ’ tactics. The relationship between protestors and the police does not 
have a unique causal determination: we have observed that protest tactics 
influence police tactics through interactive processes. For instance, the escalation 
of the anti-nuclear protest in Germany involved the ritualization of the conflict 
between an increasingly militant wing of activists and an increasingly aggressive 
police. On one side of the conflict, in fact, a militant group began to organize, 
appearing at the various protest events and pushing for direct confrontation; on 
the other side, the state police, bolstered by police units from different states, 
used massive intervention tactics. A similar ritualization of physical 
confrontations - on a larger scale - occurred between the Italian police and 
protestors throughout the 1970s. These interactive processes must be taken into 
account in explaining the dynamics of escalation.
However, as mentioned, the general trend since the 1970s and 1980s has 
been towards more tolerant policing, which tends to institutionalize protest. This 
de-escalation seems to be based on a ’virtuous circle’. The ’institutionalization’ 
of protest and social movements provides an additional reason to foresee the 
prevalence of more tolerant behaviour - also on the side of the police - as we 
can in fact expect that the more instrumental movement would have a greater 
interest in maintaining the support of public opinion. In particular, this would 
be true of those movements that are more strictly affiliated with a political party. 
The labour movement in Great Britain offers a good example for this point. 
Geary observed, in fact, that the trade unionists he interviewed were ’highly 
sensitive to the political implications of industrial disorder’ and attributed their 
sensitivity to their ’close identification with the Labor Party’ (Geary, 1985: 120). 
As one trade unionist stated, ’Miners are not fools. They almost all vote Labor 





























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The fact that violent behaviour tends to be more and more stigmatized can 
however produce new cycles of more repressive attitudes. In the late 1960s, 
Allan Silver (1967), commenting on a general trend towards increasing 
stigmatization of violence, observed the risk of no longer seeing the possibility 
of a political solution for violent behaviour. Observing the reactions to violent 
forms of protest in the 1980s, it seems that Silver was right. To provide just one 
example, writing about the 1980 Bristol riot, Joshua and Wallace stress the 
refusal of the Home Office and the national government to acknowledge the 
political and social reasons behind the events. The main reaction was instead the 
’armament’ of the police with aggressive riot equipment (the shock had been the 
fact that the police had had to withdraw from the St. Paul’s district during the 
riots): ’Then in the space of a few weeks riot equipment and tactics once 
considered unacceptable, i.e. crash helmets, new riot shields, new protective 
uniforms, and the use of police Land-rovers to break up crowds became the 
norm. CS gas was used and officially sanctioned, as were water cannons, plastic 
bullets, and armoured police vehicles as "a last resort"’ (Joshua and Wallace, 
1983: 127).
This mechanism may be re-enforced by some of the police tactics 
characterizing protest policing in Europe today: the dominant ’soft’ and tolerant 
protest policing style can also provoke violent reactions in the long run. In fact, 
the de-escalating efforts of modem protest policing may backfire. Waddington’s 
research has in particular illustrated the potential of control which can be 
achieved with this tactic, a form of control which may result in making protest 
invisible. Should the police yield to the temptation to ’over-control’ protest, 
protestors might get the impression that their demonstration was useless because 
invisible, and change to more spectacular tactics in order to make themselves 
seen and heard. Similar reactions may be provoked by the emphasis on large- 
scale collection of information, which is also characteristic of the general trend 
towards increasing control.
These last observations lead to the question: In which direction will 
protest polLi..„ in contemporary democracies move? Will the adoption of a 
’soft’, tolerant, selective, legal, preventive, consensual, flexible and professional 
protest policing style be definitive? It is not our intention to foretell the future, 
but the results of the research presented give certain indications on the basis of 
those changes singled out for the police in the process towards more tolerant 
protest policing styles. Not only the character of these changes, but also the 




























































































Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter
reversibility of the trend towards a ’softer’ and more tolerant protest policing 
style.
One theoretical possibility for a reversal of the trend is constituted by a 
change of the environment. Our research has shown that the police in their 
dealings with protest will react to shifts in the demands from outside. If these 
demands come from the government, the police are likely to fulfil them, even 
if they remain unconvinced about their usefulness or effectiveness, although they 
might voice protest. As historical examples show, police forces will fulfil 
demands by the government, even without regard for their correspondence with 
democratic rights. With this we do not wish to imply in any way that there are 
indications that such orders might be given, nor do we want to question the fact 
that democratic principles are more deeply rooted in today’s police forces than 
in earlier periods. In most European countries, in fact, the visible government 
input in the wake of the 1960s has been predominantly in the direction of 
greater respect for democratic rights and consequently ’softer’ protest policing - 
and there are no indications of a development in the contrary direction. 
However, the nature of the relationship between police and government is such 
that if a government were to order a change in public order policies, the police 
would feel bound to comply.
At least of equal importance to government input for the development of 
more tolerant protest policing styles is the pressure of public opinion, which 
over the last decades has veered in the direction of a growing acceptance of a 
wide range of previously condemned protest activities. This shift was perceived 
by the police and translated into a different policing of protest. The fact that the 
police followed this trend at least partly of their own accord (for instance, the 
Munchner Linie in Germany in the beginning of the 1960s was developed and 
initiated by the police president of the city) shows that the police do not by their 
very nature nor always call for restrictive or repressive responses. Underlying 
this attitude is the fact that a failure to perceive the preferences in the public 
would have to be paid for by a loss of legitimation, a fact about which the 
police are very conscious. Any such loss could be compensated only by the 
government’s willingness to shield the police from criticism and to back the 




























































































The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
certain degree.22 In the absence of such support the police would not ’die in the 
ditch’ for any abstract notions about order, but try to accommodate the demands 
of the public. In the same way, however, this means that the police will try to 
accommodate eventual demands by the public for ’harder’ protest policing.
By following popular shifts, the police show a capacity to learn. Changes 
and learning processes of the police are initiated by an analysis of problematic 
public ordei interventions, i.e. the police learn by analysing their failures. These 
learning processes, however, are always reactive (see Winter 1996).23 In their 
tactical and practical preparation for interventions, in fact, the police seem to 
rely to a large extent on a body of past experiences. This indicates the 
continuing utility of studying the traditions of police forces for an understanding 
of present developments, concentrating research on the everyday practice of 
protest policing. Over the last decades, the police forces in Europe have proved 
to be capable of incorporating new experiences into their body of police 
knowledge, making the continuation of a ’soft’ and tolerant protest policing style 
more likely. The importance of the body of past experience, however, seems 
such that it prevents the police from anticipating change. Tactical and strategic 
errors in confrontations with new movements and protest forms may trigger off 
a relapse into an antagonistic protest policing style.
22 Even in totalitarian states, the police depended on the acquiescence and collaboration 
of the population. The sheer numerical relationship between the police, especially the political 
branch, and the population would have made any kind of policing based on pure coercion 
impossible. The Gestapo, for instance, was not ever-present, and if it seemed to be all­
knowing, this resulted from the propagation of a respective myth and was based on large-scale 
cooperation or collaboration. On this subject see the contributions to Paul and Mallmann 
(1995).
23 This is one of the explanations for the hypothesis that the police never change, which 
to an exaggerated extent is represented by Ludtke (1992: 21). According to him, the impulse 
to ’clean up’ disorder fast and thoroughly led to the temptation of the maximum application 
of force. Considering this configuration, for Ludtke the fundamental changes in the political 
systems in Germany between the end of the 18th century and the 1980s prove to be of 
subordinate importance for policing styles. So too, the gradual changes within the police - 
professionalization, Verrechtlichung and restriction to ’security’ - failed to touch their policing 
at the core. However, in view of the changes in protest policing styles that have occurred, 
such a hypothesis seems too absolute and too theoretical. For potential protestors, the 
difference between the practice of protest policing in the 18th century and in the 1980s is 
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Notwithstanding the changes in protest policing over the past 30 years, 
there are also significant elements of continuity. The police remain the state 
agency for the protection of order and security, which they establish, if need be, 
by means of force. The range of options for intervention theoretically open to 
the police has remained basically unchanged. As underlined several times, the 
dominant protest policing style in Europe is selective, i.e. different police styles 
are used for different actors. In this way, ’brutal’ and repressive styles have 
survived. These styles are connected with the same kind of stereotypes about 
professional disturbers of the peace, conspirators, and so on as before. The 
difference today is that these stereotypes and protest policing styles are now 
applied only to a small minority among the protestors, whereas historically they 
were used against large sections of the population, such as the members and 
associations of the working-class movement. It is this kind of continuity in the 
role of the police, in the range of options theoretically open to them, and in the 
mechanisms with which they individuate and label ’dangerous’ enemies that 
constitute the most important indications for a possible arrest or reversal of the 
trend towards ’softer’ and more tolerant protest policing styles.
When we talk about a possible arrest or reversal of the trend towards 
’softer’ and more tolerant protest policing styles, we do not mean to imply a 
return to a large-scale application of antagonistic, ’brutal’ and repressive protest 
policing. We do believe, however, that a partial reversal of the restriction of 
antagonistic protest policing to ever smaller groups is possible. A hypothesis 
states that what seemed to be a long-term trend towards ’softer’ policing in 
England was shown to finish in a U-turn back to ’harder’ policing. As Robert 
Reiner (1996) argues, the dynamics of modernization explain why the ’soft’ 
style which prevailed in the 19th and a large part of the 20th centuries will be 
substituted by a ’repressive’ style. In increasingly heterogeneous and fragmented 
societies, particular protests or disorders are more likely to be seen as single 
issues and not as a potential threat to the overall social order. ’Conversely the 
police are seen not as sacred totems of a disappearing national consensus, but 
as more or less effective deliverers of practical, specific services, measured by 
the same calculus as any other business-like enterprise. Paramilitary capacity 
may be regarded as abused on specific occasions without undermining the 
legitimacy of policing as such, in much the same way as objects of protest have 
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Figure 1: Variables relevant in order to define styles of "protest policing"
"brutal" versus "soft"
referring to the degree of force used
repressive versus tolerant
referring to the number of prohibited behaviours
diffused versus selective
referring to the number of repressed groups
illegal versus legal
referring to police respect of the law
reactive versus preventive
referring to the ’timing’ of police intervention
confrontational versus consensual
referring to the degree of communication with the demonstrators
rigid versus flexible
referring to the degree of ’adaptability’
professional versus artisanal
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